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Abstract: The goal of this study is to deconstruct the meanings of the terms “quantitative” and “qualitative”, usually 
used to characterize scientific research method, or to try to undo what seems to be a mistake: the denomination and 
division of quantitative or qualitative research methods. We consider that this division confuses and impoverishes 
the conception of  knowledge or science. There are many methodological questions so plural, conflicting or not, 
according to the meaning of the investigated reality which, after all, is what should be discussed from the beginning 
to the end of the research. We add the theoretical or ideological designation of method to this discussion that for 
us represents another version of the same problem. To accomplish this goal, we discuss a view of science and a 
conception of thought.
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Introduction 
The objective of this article is quite controversial, 
mainly because it opposes what seems to be an established 
framework in human sciences, mainly in psychology: the 
division between quantitative and qualitative research 
methods. And if it is not as ambitious as the Against method 
(Feyerabend, 1977)2, then this is because its objective and 
scope are much more modest. It only intends to retreat 
from major methodological systematizations, including 
this division between quantitative and qualitative, for 
such varied and challenging methodological issues as the 
empirical issues of this research.
Considering this objective, it is worth stating what 
this article is not focused on. The article is not aimed towards 
an archeology of human sciences, notably psychology, to 
explain any eventual and current methodological constraint, 
among which there is the division between quantitative 
1 Information about funding: Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado 
de São Paulo (FAPESP), proc. 2014/17192-2.
* Correspondence address: reinaldof@ffclrp.usp.br
2 Feyerabend (1977) is one of the major science philosophers of the 20th 
century. He advocates for what he calls methodological anarchism. It 
is worth mentioning that in his discussion he approaches the scientific 
methodology of physics, which is probably the most recognized of our 
ways of knowledge. For our purposes, he states: “We see that the princi-
ples of critical rationalism (take falsification seriously; increase content; 
avoid ad hoc hypotheses; be ‘honest’ – whatever that means; and so on) 
and, a fortiori, the principles of logical empiricism (be precise; base your 
theories on measurements; avoid vague and unstable ideas; and so on) 
give an inadequate account of the past development of science and are 
liable to hinder science in the future. They give an inadequate account 
of science because science is much more ‘sloppy’ and ‘irrational’ than 
its methodological image” (page 278). For a very didactic introduction 
to the philosophical discussions on scientific methodology in the 20th 
century, refer to Chalmers, A. (2000). 
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and qualitative research methods. Neither does it intend to 
present, even briefly, the different concepts of rationality 
and quantification in human sciences, or lab experiences in 
the history of psychology. That would be a task far beyond 
our scope here, and however interesting that might be, it 
is not our proposal. This study is situated in an arena that 
we would call more democratic and pluralist in face of 
the major establishments and approaches in the history 
of scientific thought. 
It is merely about deconstructing the terms 
“quantitative” and “qualitative” used to define the scientific 
method, aiming to strengthen freedom of thought and the 
focus on or rigor in the discussion about what matters – 
problems that boost science – and the procedures used for 
its guidance. These procedures comprise quantification, 
but not as an identification of the method – which belongs 
to imagination and to the experiment rationale – nor as link 
and justification for empirical research data. The method is 
a critical activity of science, rather than a general formula 
or technique of research, as we intend to make clear further.
We will attach this discussion to the theoretical or 
ideological designation of method. To us, it is a different 
version of the same problem.
Therefore, it is about fighting or trying to undo what 
seems to be a mistake: the denomination of quantitative 
or qualitative research method that, we believe, mystifies 
the concept of knowledge or science. To the contrary, we 
would like to emphasize the many existing methodological 
issues, which are plural and controversial or consistent, 
depending on the sense of the reality surveyed. That is 
how we see the presentation of a method in Wallon, 
Vygotski, Piaget, Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, Marx, Freud, 
Durkheim etc., in line with their concepts or perspectives 
about the reality under study. We refer, therefore, to 
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method and theory built together in an investigation and in 
a circular or mutual way, so that one cannot exist without 
the other, or in a way that one cannot separate them, since 
a method assumes a question and a hypothesis or concept 
of reality. So, for example, if Freud advocates for the 
method of free association of ideas in his clinical theory 
as an investigation of the psychical reality, it is because 
he assumes such a reality through certain concepts of the 
unconscious, censorship or defense and their primary and 
secondary processes, which was created as hypotheses to 
answer a question. And if at the beginning of his theory, 
Freud used the method of hypnosis, it is also because he 
assumed that reality with an unconscious content, but not 
necessarily by highlighting the mechanisms of defense 
or censorship. It means to say that the very statute of the 
concept of unconscious in theory was different. More 
precisely, Freud started considering that unconscious 
representations resulted mainly from a psychic conflict 
between the individual’s desire and morals, and no longer, 
as supposed by Breuer, from the individual’s experience 
in a state of hypnosis or altered consciousness. This way, 
the free association of ideas aimed to circumvent the 
mechanisms of censorship of unconscious contents, or 
favor the flow of the primary process of the psyche under 
the domain of its secondary or conscious elaborations. For 
Freud, this hypothesis seemed to provide a better answer 
to the question under investigation.
Could one find, under the diversity of all theoretical 
and methodological perspectives in the history of human 
sciences, two perspectives that could be classified accor-
ding to the qualitative or quantitative method of research? 
Would the fact that one cannot find such denominations 
of method in Marx, Freud, Piaget, Wallon, Vygotski, 
Lévi-Strauss, Max Weber, Durkheim and many other 
classic thinkers of human sciences not be relevant enough? 
Would all of them have overlooked this aspect that now 
divides methodological perspectives into qualitative or 
quantitative? We will discuss a hypothetical image of 
science and of a concept of thought in an attempt to advance 
some hypotheses on the reasons for such a division.
An image of science 
We will start from a hypothetic image of science 
based on physics to rethink the division between the 
quantitative or qualitative method of research in human 
sciences. In our view, such a division is even sharper 
in psychology. We hypothesize that a more adequate 
understanding of the sense of natural sciences as model 
of scientific activity, notably the one launched by modern 
physics, can serve to deconstruct the idea of quantitative 
method and, pari passu, of qualitative method. In other 
words, a certain image of science where the control of 
variables is not only strict, but is expressed in mathematical 
formulas – knowledge that is exact or, when probabilistic, 
still aimed at accuracy – might have favored some 
numerical fetishizing. The natural order of things or of 
the phenomenon rigorously controlled and produce, i.e., 
assembled in lab according to invented and replicable 
models, can give the impression that what distinguishes 
scientific from non-scientific knowledge is the possibility 
of quantifying it and, pari passu, its methodology3. This 
is the main point of our discussion. We believe that some 
distinguishing features of this sort of knowledge should be 
made clearer.
First of all, we would like to emphasize or recall that 
quantification is not enough to build scientific knowledge, 
neither is it its main trait. There is the necessity to explain 
or show the order that links quantitative data, which enables 
talking about cause-effect relationships or the required 
initial and final conditions to the experience. In other words, 
particularly today, when there is an apparent shortage of 
reflection and when psychology – but not only psychology 
– is reduced to the production of data at the expense of 
critical analysis, therefore to the detriment of theory itself, 
we should bear in mind that quantification in science is 
part of a principle of explanation or understanding of the 
phenomenon. Ultimately, a number alone has no meaning. 
A number only acquires meaning in an analytical context 
of sense. This thesis does not seem to be (or should not be) 
subject to contention. It can serve as the supporting point 
to the beginning of our discussion, because the activity that 
will organize the accomplishment of this analytical context 
of sense that comprises quantification will be named 
method of research.
For this reason, we would firstly like to emphasize 
(keeping in mind that we are dealing with an image of 
natural sciences) that the experience created and replicated 
in labs is organized by a theoretical model of investigation 
that works on some hypotheses regarding reality. In other 
words, it is not a free or spontaneous observation because 
it is driven by certain questions and hypotheses about 
reality. One could say that this principle, which emphasizes 
the active and organizing role of thought in scientific 
investigation, is shared by most philosophers of science in 
the 20th century.
For example, Popper – contemporary to the theory 
of the physics of relativity – dealt with the provisionary 
trait of scientific knowledge, while Kant – contemporary to 
Newton – believed that scientific knowledge could only be 
improved, but never replaced or rebutted. However, prior to 
Popper (1963/1994), Kant (1781/1989) had already covered 
this issue – we could also mention Kuhn’s (1962/2009) 
notion of paradigm –, that reason only learns with nature by 
forcing it to give answers to reason’s questions, following 
3 In the strict sense of the term, methodology is the study of the method. 
So, while method has a more positive or determined nature, methodo-
logy’s nature is more general, abstracting from method its essential traits. 
For the purposes of this article, the differentiation between the terms 
“method” or “methodology” does not matter, neither does their variation 
with the term “research” (quantitative or qualitative). What effectively 
concerns us are the adjectives “quantitative” and “qualitative” to desig-
nate method, methodology or research in the light of the meaning of 
scientific activity.
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thought-out plans. According to Kant (1781/1989) in the 
preface of Critique of pure reason:
When Galileo caused balls, the weights of which he 
had himself previously determined, to roll down an 
inclined plane; when Torricelli made the air carry 
a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be 
equal to that of a definite volume of water… a dawn 
broke upon all students of nature. They learned that 
reason only has insight into that which it produces 
after a plan of its own, and that it must not allow 
itself to be kept, as it were, in nature’s leading-
strings, but must itself show the way with principles 
of judgment based upon fixed laws, constraining 
nature to give answer to questions of reason’s own 
determining. Accidental observations, made in 
obedience to no previously thought-out plan, can 
never be made to yield a necessary law, which 
reason alone is concerned with discovering. (p. 18)
Or also,
Reason, holding its principles in the one hand, 
according to which alone concordant appearances 
can be admitted as equivalent to laws, and, in the 
other hand the experiment which is devised in 
conformity with these principles, must approach 
nature in order to be taught by it. It must not, 
however, do so in the character of a pupil who 
listens to everything that the teacher chooses to say, 
but rather as an appointed judge who compels the 
witness to answer questions which he himself has 
formulated. (p. 18)
Only for clarification purposes (we do not wish to 
introduce Kant’s philosophy), among the principles that 
guide reason in its judgment about nature, as referred by the 
author, is determinism, the concept that natural phenomena 
are linked according to relationships of necessity, which 
makes it possible to state these relationships in laws. It is 
the concept of “nature” itself, founded in modernity. What 
really matters to us here is that this principle is not applicable 
without a plan, i.e., without imagining and assembling 
an experiment on the hypotheses about certain natural 
relationships, as in the examples cited above of Galileo and 
Torricelli. Here, what is more important in these examples 
is to emphasize the assembling of the experiment, i.e., the 
method to verify the hypothesis or answer the scientist’s 
question before nature; in the method, quantification is just 
one of its elements or procedures.
Merleau-Ponty (1949-52/1988) is another 
philosopher who also highlights this role of active and 
creative thought in science. He did not overlook some of 
the main issues highlighted by Kant regarding scientific 
activity when he states:
Paradox of science is that in order to understand the 
concrete, we must begin, in a sense, by turning our 
backs to it. Galileo had to reconstruct the givens 
of the senses by an intellectual step. When, on the 
contrary, the desire is to notice the fact directly (for 
instance, how Aristotle noted the natural link of 
heavy bodies), one is led to abstractions. Science 
commences the day that, instead of passively 
noticing, it reconstructs appearances, thus giving 
itself models of reality. (free translation, p. 486)
It is worth noting that Merleau-Ponty reverses the 
ordinary concept about the difference between abstract and 
concrete precisely to highlight the importance of the model 
in the intellectual reconstruction of appearances or data 
of senses. Simple observation does not lead to knowledge 
about reality. Here, being the closest to it, i.e., the sensitive 
appearance is farther from knowledge in terms of reality. It 
is farther because it assumes the creation of an intellectual 
model of reality, i.e., the reconstruction of data of sense, 
turns out to be closer to its knowledge.
In this sense, Bachelard (1934/1985) employs the 
term phenomeno-technique to emphasize the artificial 
nature of scientific experiments, i.e., that which produces 
its phenomenon as experimentation. Latour and Woolgar 
(1979/1997) emphasize how the simple presence of technical 
devices in a research lab represents reified theories used to 
build new scientific facts. In other words, these theories are 
incorporated into devices with no further discussion, as if 
they represented reality, and are used to investigate new lab 
phenomena, which, in turn, lead to new facts and materials. 
For example, the telescope used by Galileo to observe the 
sky assumed the theoretical model of the optical physics 
it contained – which, incidentally, raised much discussion 
at the time – and led to the discovery of new celestial 
phenomena (Furlan, 2008). Thus, science becomes the 
model of a complex theoretical and instrumental network 
about reality.
Finally, according to Heidegger (1938/2001), we 
could say that technique is at the heart of modern science, 
which aims to control and manipulate nature, hence the 
need for measurement or quantification as expressed in 
mathematical equations. So, from the perspective of ethics 
or of the evaluation of a way of life, we could question the 
impact of the supremacy of this kind of human view or 
behavior on life, a subject we are not addressing here. What 
cannot be done is to confuse the intellectual assembling 
of the scientific experience, of which measurement is part, 
with the quantitative method. That would be like taking the 
part as the whole. The method, as we emphasize, belongs 
much more to imagination and invention of experience 
than to the quantification of its variables, which are 
attached to imagination and invention. Here, it is worth 
mentioning the anecdote by Popper (1963/1994) that 
he started a conference in Vienna by asking the physics 
students to take their pencils and paper and carefully 
observe and record their observations. The students 
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naturally asked him what he wanted them to observe. After 
all, observe what, for what purpose? The same holds for 
quantification and measurement: without a principle of 
selection and linkage, they will lead nowhere. Or, with 
regard to observation, this shortage may lead to mysticism 
or to experiencing the sublime, according to Kant. Or, 
according to phenomenology, it could lead to the primordial 
ground of our pre-reflexive experience of the world, i.e., 
to the transcendental field of senses. Or, according to the 
philosophies of Nietzsche and Deleuze, it could lead to 
the transcendental field of forces and intensities. 
But this, however important, is not creating science. 
Science will always be a (limited) plan of understanding 
reality, built from a principle of selecting and linking 
variables, which can comprise quantification. The mathe-
matization of nature could even be the objective of know-
ledge, representing a very reductive principle of knowledge 
which proved powerful for the manipulation or control 
of reality (the principle of technique, as mentioned 
with Heidegger). Quantification, however, can only be 
considered as a method as much as observation can; i.e., 
it cannot, as long as it is not subjected to, or inserted into, 
a plan to build knowledge, or, in other words, as long as it 
does not justify the elaboration of a method with hypotheses 
about reality.
So, once suspicion is cast on the pertinence of the 
quantitative method to designate scientific methodology 
(here based on one of the most well-established models 
of science, i.e., physics), the same occurs to the notion 
of the qualitative method, which only makes sense in 
opposition to the quantitative method. After all, the 
qualitative method only exists in opposition or criticism 
to the quantitative. In other words, quantification is not 
enough to understand or explain a phenomenon. But that 
is what we have just seen.
This can be illustrated by Ginzburg’s (1976/2006) 
preface to the Italian edition of his work, The Cheese 
and the Worms. Here, he investigates the everyday life 
of a miller named Menocchio. The miller lived in the 16th 
century, in the north of Italy, and had his ideas persecuted 
by the Inquisition. Ginzburg works on the documents 
the Inquisition produced on Menocchio. He justifies his 
research through several theoretical and methodological 
discussions that are always interconnected. It is worth 
noting that the author does not intend to deny or oppose the 
dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative research – 
which we do – although his result seems to be exactly that. 
For our purposes, we start with a passage where he uses the 
metaphor of a computer to identify the spirit of quantitative 
research:
With this, it is not my intention to pass judgment 
on qualitative versus quantitative research; quite 
simply, it must be emphasized that, as far as the 
history of the subordinate classes is concerned, the 
precision of the latter cannot do without (cannot 
do yet, that is) the notorious impressionism of 
the former. E.P. Thompson’s telling remark about 
“the gross reiterative impressionism of a computer, 
which repeats the conformity ad nauseam while 
obliterating all evidence for which it has not been 
programmed” is literally true in the sense that the 
computer, obviously, executes but does not think. 
On the other hand, only a series of specific in-depth 
investigations may permit the development of an 
articulate program to be submitted to the computer. 
(p. 21)
The example seems quite illustrative of our 
discussion. After all, someone must think as the computer 
programmer does, who, as Ginzburg concludes, must be 
capable of highlighting and articulating significant data 
to the question under investigation. This, in turn, implies 
a theory and a hypothesis on reality (just as Galileo and 
Torricelli did, in our aforementioned citation of Kant). 
The programmer, we could add, must also be capable of 
reprogramming the computer if reality so demands, as 
many times as required. Other researchers, following the 
same line of research, should do the same to prevent the risk 
of “impressionism” of the computer or, we might say, of its 
“subjectivism”. It is a curious or unusual inversion of terms, 
but one that actually points out that behind the rigidity of a 
concept there is the exaggerated presence of a given way of 
looking at and conceiving reality.
The meaning of “notorious impressionism of 
qualitative” is also worth highlighting in the quotation. 
Ultimately, it means lack of empirical foundation, or a 
speculative nature without the due empirical counterpart. 
Therefore, assuming that the qualitative method opposes 
the quantitative, in the perspective that quantification is not 
enough to explain a phenomenon, we have the motivational 
background for the dispute between the quantitative or 
qualitative research methods. Here, the “qualitative” 
accuses the lack of “thought” in the “quantitative”, and the 
latter, in turn, claims that there is an “excess” of extremely 
speculative thought in the “qualitative” method. In other 
words, all this is nothing but a disagreement about the 
sense of the object or reality investigated. And this sense 
of the investigated object or reality is what should be 
discussed from the beginning to the end of the research, 
but it is mistakenly reified through the qualitative and 
quantitative terms. Besides being instigating, is Ginzburg’s 
aforementioned research work empirically well-grounded? 
This is the point.
On the other hand, Ginzburg refers to the history 
of ideas, which, according to him, has conducted broad 
quantitative surveys of the ideas found in a given time 
and place. However, it does not ask questions regarding 
the effective use of this written material by the poorest. 
Menocchio is a very singular example of this, since he not 
only used to read more erudite texts, but he also conjugated 
them in an original way with his oral tradition.
Ginzburg’s criticism of quantitative research in the 
history of the ideas does not refer exactly to quantification 
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procedures, which, in fact, are found in any empirical 
research, in one way or another. In the case of Menocchio, 
Ginzburg himself works on a set of documents written by 
the Inquisition and others written by the defendant. The 
mistakes highlighted by Ginzburg Ginzburg always refer 
to a given conception of historical reality, which, in this 
case, is due to the fact that the history of ideas does not 
consider the reader’s role in relation to the written word.
His criticism of the history of mentalities follows 
the same direction. According to Ginzburg, Lucien Febvre 
is a case in point of the history of mentalities. The history of 
mentalities presupposes a spirit that is typical of that time 
and that underlies the history of ideas, as it incorporates 
habits and unconscious meanings to the research. Thus, it 
has a broader meaning or a meaning that is closer to reality, 
whereas the published ideas are only a quite incomplete 
or particular manifestation of the same reality. However, 
according to Ginzburg, the history of mentalities still 
assumes a homogeneous reality to different social classes, 
concealing their differences.
The notion of popular culture – which is the 
object of his research – at least avoids this inter-class 
homogenizing extension. The author insists that he is not 
unaware of the broad scope of the term and that there 
are differences, for example, between rural and urban 
populations. The challenge here is the access to the past 
of this mainly oral culture. Anthropologists have access 
to it when studying the present, while historians cannot go 
back to the past and witness the orality of ancient cultures. 
But historiographical research has partially circumvented 
this problem as it starts to have access to more popular 
publications such as the cordel literature, which at 
least represents a set of ideas that circulated among the 
subordinate classes of the population.
It is in this perspective that Ginzburg also finds in 
the Inquisition’s archives about Menocchio a direct material 
regarding the popular culture of that time. Obvious-
ly, because Menocchio can read and write, he is not a 
manifestation of pure popular culture as he is pervaded by 
the ideas of the literate elite. However, to Ginzburg, this 
is not exactly a problem, because his aim is not to isolate 
one culture from the other (popular and erudite), but rather 
to understand the circulation between them. Neither is it a 
matter of disregarding the broader context evidenced by 
the case. A highlight in that context is the press expansion 
– that allowed easier access to written materials – and 
the Reformation movement – which fostered the boldness 
to talk about and express his religious ideas. It is also 
worth noting that the Counter-Reformation worsened the 
repression of freedom of speech, which eventually caused 
Menocchio to be burnt by the Inquisition.
None of these questions refer to quantification. 
Ginzburg only challenges it regarding its assumptions 
about historical theory, more specifically regarding what is 
not considered from a theoretical viewpoint of reality. This 
is what he is really concerned with, and is what he tries 
to discuss in his preface. Thus, the terms “quantitative” or 
“qualitative” used to designate the research method can be 
considered a reification of theoretical and epistemological 
concepts, while discussions regarding such concepts 
are left aside. These resemble archeological remainders 
which are taken per se, separated from the living thought 
in which they participated with their hesitations and bets 
that are susceptible to abandonment or development. This 
means that what is at stake in using or abandoning the 
terms quantitative or qualitative in research projects is 
the prerogative of dead or living thoughts. In other words, 
which emphasis will be privileged in the research, i.e., the 
technical one – taken as a method – or the method, always 
attentive to the logic of its articulation with the issue.
In sum, any empirical datum is always a construction 
in function of the question that highlights it. Therefore, it 
does not give up the singularity of the view and thought 
of the researcher (like in the examples of Galileo and 
Torricelli, quoted by Kant, or of the computer programmer, 
quoted by Ginzburg). Or, as Lenclude (1991) emphasizes 
about the ethnographic method – and, to us, this is also 
valid for natural and human sciences in general –, the 
ethnographic document “is ‘created’ by the questioning 
that gave rise to it and by the operation that isolated it 
from practice to promote it into a knowledge instrument” 
(free translation of page 475, emphasis added). Obviously, 
this is also applicable to data of statistical measurements 
and analyses of empirical research in the human sciences. 
These can be important means for investigating reality, 
provided the researcher is not charmed by its apparent 
objectivity (Boudon & Bourricaud, 1982, p. 370), because 
what matters is to discuss the adequacy and scope or limits 
of data related to the question to be answered. That is why 
the method is not reduced to a quantification technique, 
which leads Boudon and Bourricaud (1982) to emphasize 
that the method is, par excellence, “explanation of text” 
(p. 369), i.e., discussion and justification of procedures for 
guiding the investigated issue.
A concept of thought 
Another way to approach the issue of the division 
between quantitative and qualitative research methods in 
human sciences, notably in psychology, is to highlight what 
seems to be a general retreat of the activity of thinking. 
Then we can see that the problem we are dealing with is 
broader than the simple division between qualitative or 
quantitative research methods. After all, an analogous 
situation can take place with any theoretical or ideological 
denomination of a method added to the research, such as 
the “positivist” (today, generally used by its critics, i.e., 
applied to other people’s research), the “phenomenological”, 
“Marxist”, “psychoanalytical” etc., whatever all this could 
mean from the methodological point of view. This is very 
much thanks to the generality of each of those perspectives, 
including the diversity of the perspectives in the heart of 
each of them and, many times, in the history of the same 
author’s thinking. Hence, if potential identity reactions to 
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the contrast of the division established between quantitative 
and qualitative research methods were not enough, here we 
add the risk of resistance by those that fit their research into 
some current of thought.
We would like to convince, or at least invite people 
to think that such identifications, rather than fostering 
good research experiences, could be a way of limiting one’s 
thoughts. Well, if we added questions related to theoretical 
or ideological designations of method to the issue of 
division between quantitative and qualitative research 
methods, it is because we view in the former another 
version of the same problem as in the latter. After all, what 
could one expect from such statements? To top the question 
or problem with a certain approach of sense that, and this 
should be emphasized, does not even ensure an appropriate 
use, given its general nature?
It definitely does not mean that such research 
approaches cannot be valuable or present when considering 
the question. We should bear in mind that no one begins 
a research project completely empty, or that any research 
brings a given theoretical perspective or view (cf. Furlan, 
2008), just like method and theoretical perspectives are built 
together, as aforementioned. However, it seems inadequate 
to confound the generality of a theoretical perspective 
with the accuracy or delimitation of a methodological 
procedure that any empirical research should have. Hence, 
if in principle we brought method closer to theory, now 
we would like to make a distinction that seems crucial to 
conduct any empirical research. A method presupposes 
control of procedures, as in the examples of Galileo and 
Torricelli mentioned by Kant in the preface to the Critique 
of pure reason, or the examples we gave of the methods 
of hypnosis or free association of ideas in psychoanalysis. 
Therefore, a method can be applied to reality.
In contrast, a theoretical perspective is a way of 
investigating reality that merges with the “glance” of the 
researcher or with the researcher himself. Put differently, 
stricto sensu, marxism, psychoanalysis, phenomenology, 
constructivism, socio-constructivism, schizoanalysis or 
any other current of thought cannot be applied to an empi-
rical research, although the researcher can “be” marxist, 
psychoanalyst, phenomenologist, constructivist, socio-
constructivist, schizoanalyst, etc., in investigating reality, 
and then employ, according to such schools of thought, the 
procedures or methods considered suitable to that research 
of reality. In fact, we are usually a “mix” of theoretical 
perspectives that are as inseparable as – paraphrasing 
Descartes – the substantial union between “body and 
soul”. It does not mean there are no stars with different 
magnitudes, as Merleau-Ponty says about the importance 
of others in building our subjectivities (1964).
However, we should not confound the great 
theoretical perspectives that, by definition, are open, 
despite the design that differentiates one from the other, 
with the application of a method that, by definition, 
should be accurate (and “accurate” does not mean static, 
not subject to adjustments or not demanding other types 
of procedures). Psychoanalysts, for example, will find in 
their “object” of study methodological procedures that 
enable the emergence of unconscious senses under the 
symptom experienced. Which are these procedures? It is 
the researcher’s imagination that should develop them, 
such as Freud does with the free association of ideas on 
the divan, in accordance with his theoretical assumptions. 
Each psychoanalytical current can outline one procedure 
or another according to its specificity in relation to the 
other ones (e.g., certain games or play activities for child 
psychoanalysis). A Marxist will find procedures that can 
bring to light social contradictions in the production of 
human reality under the discourse or manifested sense 
of the facts, and according to their specificity in relation 
to other Marxist currents. A phenomenologist, in turn, 
will find procedures that can help to highlight senses 
and describe them free of any previous theory, according 
to the “method of epoché” (suspension of judgments), as 
advocated by Husserl.
The radicalism of the phenomenological proposal, 
intended to position itself prior to any theory or concept of 
reality, seems to be privileged to place us in the heart of the 
discussion. After all, is such a suspension of judgments 
possible? Or, to what extent is such a suspension of 
judgments possible? Why, as Merleau-Ponty (1945/1994) 
states in the preface to the Phenomenology of Perception, 
is phenomenology recognized by an inchoative style 
or movement of thoughts rather than by “a doctrine or 
a system”? (p. 20). What method is that but the general 
prescription to describe the perceived meaning (sens) 
rather than explaining it according to accepted theses on 
reality?
According to the main perspective that Merleau-
Ponty (1945/1994) teaches us in the same work, we can 
add that if we could suspend all of our theses, as advocated 
by Husserl, even then, with any single movement to say 
the meaning (sens) of what we see or perceive, we would 
already be in the implicit field of meanings (sens) we 
have about the world. This is why the phenomenological 
reduction is an endless process. We do not have to be a 
follower of Merleau-Ponty to embrace this thesis. The 
author himself, by the way, would not give up the mediation 
of science research to unveil the meaning (sens) of reality 
(therefore, to conduct his own phenomenology). In other 
words, an author who would not give up research that went 
beyond the precept of simple description of phenomena and 
advanced hypotheses and models on reality.
If we simply observe works and perspectives of the 
different authors in the phenomenological current, we will 
be convinced that such terminological generality is not 
tout court applicable. This also holds for psychoanalysis, 
marxism or any other theoretical or ideological current of 
thought.4 And it holds simply because we cannot separate 
ourselves from the implicit meanings (sens) we have of the 
4 By ideology we mean a coherent set of ideas to explain or understand the 
world.
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world as if we were taking off one shirt and putting on 
another, or changing the lenses of our glasses, as is usually 
said about the currents of thought we use to think about 
reality, because here we are talking about the body itself or 
the eye itself. We might, if we like, assume the existence 
of both definitions of methods. One that is more general 
(theoretical or ideological), as a way or style of thinking, 
i.e., of selecting and linking variables in the light of the 
theoretical perspective. The other, more specific, justifies 
and accurately defines its procedures and determines, in 
a restricted way, the fate of a research (so many research 
works have achieved surprising results only because of the 
genius of the researcher when assembling an experiment!), 
always bearing in mind its intrinsic relationship with the 
theorization of reality, i.e., the instable or dialectic game5 
of their mutual determinations.
For purposes of clarity, we reserved the denomi-
nation of research method to the latter concept. We do so 
because it is through this concept that one can concretely 
conduct the development of the question to be researched, 
i.e., the technical or practical procedures through which 
one tries to answer the research question: interviews, 
observations, statistical procedures, etc., in their different 
modes and situations. And if we reserve the denomination 
of method to the conduction of the concrete research 
procedures that can be controlled when confronting the 
question – which, per se, explodes the binary division 
between the qualitative or quantitative research methods –, 
then one cannot understand method as technique because, 
as we have demonstrated throughout this paper, thought 
is always in the instable or dialectic relationship between 
those procedures and the theoretical field wherein they are 
situated.
This is the point we would like to stress: the need 
to prevent the risk of emptying the theoretical discussion 
implicit in any methodological procedure. To put it another 
way, a method is never ready and, therefore, is not a simple 
technique. Rather, the use of a technique is justified in the 
method, just like its justification in research is part of the 
method, depending on its hypotheses about reality.
To conclude this point about the theoretical-
methodological heritage that grounds our way of thinking 
about reality, we believe it deserves a longer citation of what 
Merleau-Ponty (1960/1984) says about what he inherited 
from Husserl’s thought. For us, it is also valid for all classic 
thoughts of human sciences that we mention herein:
Tradition means the forgetting of its origins, the 
aging Husserl used to say. Precisely because we owe 
him so much, we are in no position to see just what 
belongs to him. With regard to a philosopher whose 
5 By dialectic we mean, just like Merleau-Ponty (1964, pp. 124-128), the 
instable thinking in contact with the being: “the instable dialectic, in the 
sense assigned by chemists to the word… One of the tasks of dialectic, 
as thought about a situation, thought in contact with being, is to shake 
false evidence, denounce meanings cut off from the experience of being, 
emptied, and criticize itself as it becomes one of them… It must be self-
critical” (free translation of page 124). 
venture has awakened so many echoes, and such an 
apparent distance from the point where he himself 
stood, any commemoration is also a betrayal (…). 
But Husserl was well aware of these difficulties 
– which are problems of communication between 
“egos” – and he does not leave us to confront them 
without resources. I lend myself to others; I create 
others from my own thoughts. This is no failure to 
perceive others; it is the perception of others. We 
would not overwhelm them with our importunate 
comments, we would not stingily reduce them to 
what is objectively certified of them, if they were 
not for us to begin with. Not to be sure with the 
frontal evidence of a thing, but installed athwart 
our thought and, like different selves of our own, 
occupying a region which belongs to no one else 
but them. (p. 239)
To subsequently complete that it is impossible, even 
by right, to separate, at each moment, what belongs to the 
thought of each one:
The reason why we think that interpretation is 
restricted to either inevitable distortion or literal 
reproduction is that we want the meaning of a man’s 
works to be fully positive and by rights susceptible 
to an inventory which sets forth what is and is not in 
those works. But this is to be deceived about works 
and thought. (page 241)
Obviously, an empirical research is not a comment 
about a work. However, when one intends to use it as 
theoretical-methodological principle, it is subject to the 
same kind of dialogue as mentioned by Merleau-Ponty 
concerning philosophical thought. Therefore, as we have 
exposed, it cannot be duly applied as a method simply 
because theory is not an object for our thought, an idea 
that we can manipulate and adjust to reality, as with our 
empirical research procedures. In other words, it is more 
in us (transversely, according to the citation) and in a 
“confused” way (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 1951/1991), i.e., in 
communication with other works, more than in front of us 
and subject to manipulation.
But all this is just the formal aspect of our question, 
which, in our view, does not supports neither the empty 
generality of the terms “quantitative” or “qualitative” 
(which have little meaning) nor the concept of a method 
where procedures cannot be defined and controlled, as in 
the case of theoretical or ideological currents. It is just the 
formal aspect because what matters in research is, first 
of all, to think freely and with an open spirit about the 
question to be researched. This should not be confused 
with a lack of the theoretical and empirical rigor required 
in any research. Quite the opposite, this rigor should be 
a consequence of the freedom and openness of spirit, 
of the respect for the singularity and complexity of any 
phenomenon.
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There are many potential perspectives to develop a 
question6, but whatever the perspective, it should be to the 
service of exercising thought in the investigation. That is to 
say that previous theoretical-methodological perspectives 
should not subdue thought, which would mean to enclose it 
in the thinking of someone else who effectively thought to 
elaborate a problem. This statement does not underestimate 
the importance of reading classic works to think about 
reality and conduct research in human sciences.7
Generally speaking, theoretical-methodological 
perspectives, considering the questionings and exceptions 
about their identity and use, emerge immanent to the 
research, like a force to open and apprehend the mean-
ing (sens) of world, in their analytical capacity of 
developing the question, rather than as labels stuck on the 
presentation of the method (by the way, how many works 
have not betrayed, in form and content, the theoretical-
methodological perspective that they promised, which just 
goes to show, as said earlier, that this cannot be tout court 
applied).
To put it differently, one can “be” marxist, 
psychoanalyst, phenomenologist, foucauldian, socio-cons-
tructivist, schizoanalyst, etc. or, as we would rather say, we 
are a style or a given way of perceiving, feeling and saying 
reality. But this should favor openness rather than closure 
in our experience of the world. Indeed, the importance of 
language on the way the world is perceived already seems 
a datum. In this sense, as Feyerabend (1977) highlights, 
“languages and the reaction patterns they involved are 
not merely instruments for describing events (facts, states 
of affairs), but that they are also shapers of events (facts, 
states of affairs)” (page 349). In the specific case of science, 
it is what Kuhn (1962/2009) called paradigm, and Deleuze 
and Guattari called partial or scientific observers (1991) 
to emphasize the intrinsic link between perception and 
language, or between a certain form of sensitiveness and the 
scientific elaboration of the world. However, what matters 
is that such sensitiveness should also be open enough to 
prevent being subdued by the determination of concepts, 
and vice-versa, concepts should be open enough to prevent 
being subdued by certain perception patterns, otherwise, 
thought would lose its power or capacity of exploitation.
This means that we should not attach priority to 
one of these faculties (perception, feeling and speech) nor 
consider them as separated in building knowledge, because 
they pervade each other and are mutually constituted. 
More specifically, what matters is not to conceive the 
communication between these faculties exclusively from 
the point of view of their agreement in the process of 
knowledge, but also from the point of view of their tensions 
or disagreements that challenge us to new arrangements 
between our language and perception of the world or, 
simply, that challenge us to think.
6 Perspective means the concentration of the view on a given direction, the 
source of its power to unveil meaning, but also of its limitation - anyway, 
what would be a view with no perspective?
7 In this respect, refer to Furlan (2012, p. 212).
In sum, besides exposing and justifying the 
concrete methodological procedures through which one 
intends to deal with the question, which already brings 
many theoretical implications about reality, to state 
that the method is quantitative, qualitative, Marxist, 
psychoanalytical, schizoanalitic, phenomenological, 
socio-cons tructivist, etc. will add nothing from the episte-
mological point of view, whether because of the empty 
meaning of the terms “quantitative” or “qualitative”, 
or because of the uncontrolled generality of the terms 
of theoretical or ideological currents. Moreover, it can 
jeopardize the freedom or the full exercise of the act of 
thinking in research.
At worst, these denominations aim to protect 
a research from its weaknesses. It is as if the first two 
terms represented methodological options that should 
be respected (but they should not), and the other terms 
summoned the authority of imaginary allies to remedy 
their shortcomings, as if, by reading such research, we 
should also suppose what Marx, Freud, Husserl, Foucault, 
Piaget, Vygotsky, etc., wrote (not to mention when such 
methodological denominations are just a compliance with 
the protocol imposed by some academic tradition of doing 
science).
In this perspective, the occasional necessity to name 
what is being done can be amazing. It is a question that 
obviously paves the way for broader reflection that exceeds 
the scope of this article. Nevertheless, we would like to 
stress that it is a potential symptom of a retreat of thought 
or avoidance of the necessity to think8 – in this case, retreat 
from the necessity to soundly justify the method in its 
tense or dialectic relation with the question researched (its 
adequacy, scope and limitations). Therefore, as subterfuge 
to get rid of bothersome problem.
Finally, and as we started this article by excluding 
the terms “quantitative” or “qualitative” or the terms of 
“theoretical currents” or “ideological currents”, we propose 
a terminological cleaning or economy in the denomination 
of research methods. That would both comply with the 
meaning of scientific activity, and keep the focus on 
what matters, which should sharpen the need for method 
justification in any research. An economy, therefore, to 
improve clarity and increase the necessity to think.
8 We find in Proust (1913/1987) an interesting parallel to this question 
when, recalling his childhood, he says that after reading for long hours, 
he used to go for a walk. As his body was excited with so many ideas, 
he used to strike things around with his umbrella or walking stick, with 
“happy screams and had not yet reached a condition of full clarity, choo-
sing, instead of a slow and painful path to clarification, the pleasure of an 
easier derivation for immediate escape”. To supplement: “Most of these 
alleged translations of our feelings do nothing but disentangle us from 
them, making us leave ourselves under an unclear form that does not te-
ach us to know our feelings (free translation of pages 152-153, emphasis 
added).
912017   I   volume 28   I   número 1   I   83-92
Reflections on method in human sciences: quantitative or qualitative, theories and ideologies 
91
Reflexões sobre o método nas ciências humanas: quantitativo ou qualitativo, teorias e ideologias 
Resumo: O objetivo deste ensaio é desconstruir os termos “quantitativo” e “qualitativo” usados para caracterizar o método de 
pesquisa científica, ou tentar desfazer o que nos parece um equívoco: a denominação e divisão de método quantitativo ou 
qualitativo de pesquisa, que para nós mistifica e empobrece a concepção de conhecimento ou ciência. Há muitas questões 
metodológicas, tão plurais, conflitantes ou não, conforme o sentido da realidade investigada, que, afinal, é o que tem que 
ser discutido, do princípio ao fim da pesquisa. Atrelaremos a essa discussão a designação teórica ou ideológica de “método”, 
que para nós representa outra versão do mesmo problema. Para alcançar esse objetivo, discutiremos determinada imagem de 
ciência e concepção de pensamento.
Palavras-chave: metodologias, ciência, ciências humanas, pesquisa quantitativa, pesquisa qualitativa.
Réflexions sur la méthode dans les sciences humaines: quantitative ou qualitative, théories et idéologies
Résumé: L’objectif de ce travail est de déconstruire les termes quantitatifs et qualitatifs utilisés pour caractériser la méthode de 
recherche scientifique, ou d’essayer de défaire ce qui nous semble être une erreur: la dénomination et division de la méthode 
de recherche quantitative ou qualitative, ce que, à notre avis, mystifie et appauvrit la conception de la connaissance ou de la 
science. Il y a beaucoup de questions méthodologiques, tellement plurielles, contradictoires ou non, en fonction du sens de la 
réalité de l’enquête, ce qui est en fait ce qui doit être discuté, du début à la fin de la recherche. Nous ajoutons à cette discussion, 
la désignation théorique ou idéologique de la méthode, qui pour nous représente une autre version du même problème. Pour 
atteindre cet objectif, nous discutons une certaine image de la science et conception de la pensée. 
Mots-clés: méthodologies, science, sciences humaines, recherche quantitative, recherche qualitative. 
Reflexiones sobre el método en las humanidades: cuantitativo o cualitativo, teorías e ideologías
Resumen: El objetivo de este trabajo es deconstruir los términos cuantitativos y cualitativos utilizados para caracterizar lo 
método de investigación científica, o intentar deshacer lo que nos parece un equívoco: la denominación y división de método 
de investigación cuantitativa o cualitativa, que a nosotros mistifica y empobrece la concepción de conocimiento o ciencia. Hay 
muchas cuestiones metodológicas, tan plurales, conflictivas o no, dependiendo del sentido de la realidad investigada, que en 
definitiva es lo que tiene que ser discutido, desde el principio hasta el final de la investigación. Añadimos a esta discusión la 
designación teórica o ideológica de método, que para nosotros representa otra versión del mismo problema. Para lograr este 
objetivo, discutiremos una cierta imagen de ciencia y concepción de pensamiento.
Palabras-clave: metodologías, ciencia, ciencias humanas, investigación cuantitativa, investigación cualitativa.
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